

Democratic Decision Making in Islam: Evidence from the Practices of the Early Islamic *Khulafa*

Dr. M. Monirurzaman*

Abstract

Majority opinion and political participation are vital in democratic decision making processes. In Islam too, these two factors are deemed to be central in decision making process. Analysis of the practices of the early caliphs demonstrates that political participation in the early Islamic state was obviously evident. However, the form of participation was qualitative and not quantitative; thus, it was not an exact prototype to the present day democratic system. Decisions were qualitatively participatory regarding issues at the central level but quantitative aspect was given foremost consideration in general regarding issues of the decentralized areas. The practices of the early Islamic caliphs prescribe four different methods of participation in political decision making. What is even more is that the process clearly advanced from limited to greater participation of the people, which is to say that democratic decision making was inherent in the Islamic political system.

Majority opinion and political participation are two inseparable components of modern day democratic decision making practice. In Islam too, these two factors are deemed to be central in decision making process. The *Qur'anic* diction in this regard reads- *wa amruhum shura bainahum* (and they decide their affairs by mutual Consultation: 42:38). The time of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and the first four *Khulafa* is the most, perhaps the only, contemporary reference for authentic practice of Islam, thus their practices are regarded as a foundation and a source of law as well. However, what was the understanding about majority opinion and political participation in that period is a sort of significant question needing investigation at a time when Islam is under enormous

* Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia

intellectual and ideological challenge from the Western pluralist democratic tradition. Was the majority opinion during the early days of Islam, as in the democracy upholds it to be, the source for political legitimacy and decision making, as some of the contemporary Muslim scholars are of the same opinion as they categorize Islam with Constitutional democracy? Problems likelier still, are, of late, soaring up with political dissents- parties and ideologues.¹

This paper attempts to analyze the practices of the early caliphs, as to show how they appreciated people's opinions and their participation in political, administrative and decision making processes. In so doing the entire analysis is likely to be based on four hypotheses at least.

1. That the practice of majority opinion in decision making process was a dependent factor upon the understanding and opinion of the minority but most experienced and versatile Sahaba (companions).
2. That the form of majority opinion was an *aposteriori* practice in the shape of bai'ah in contrast to *apriori* practice.
3. That a single or a few persons' right opinion was more powerful and, therefore, practiced rather than the majority opinion to be discarded when the latter was considered untenable or unislamic.
4. That in their 'decentralized' system of governance the value of majority opinion of the people concerned (who were outside the direct domain of the central authority) was held to be of much more reflective and functional utility and impact than the opinion of central authority.

Literature Review

Although a great deal of works have been done on the question of legitimacy in Islam based on the practices of the early Islamic caliphs (*Khulafa al Rashidun*), no viable work came to my notice on the practice of majority opinion by them. So far that practice of the period under review reveals that there was no formal election as

such, at that, time either for the highest authority- the office of the Caliph, legislative councilor even *Shura* council (consultative body) for that matter. However, we encounter authoritative Bodies and Organs such as *Ahl al Badr*², *Ahl al Shura* which were highly powerful and significant in state apparatus but were never formally elected. They were but that community of the leading companions in respects of sociopolitical status and high authority of the *Shariah* knowledge. References were frequently made to them in major sociopolitical problems, which means that their opinion used to represent the opinion of the people. This features that major characteristics of the political or apolitical participation of that period.

In contrast, we find and visualize the gamut of political movements where people showed active interest and participation despite their allegiance and fidelity for the authoritative bodies. These public behaviors tantamount to the greater mass political participation system of modern day democracy. Notwithstanding this, the general feature of political participation of the period was different in many respects. Nevertheless, no critical investigation has so far been made, as far as my enquiry is concerned, on the form of political participation as such in the decision making processes.

Hence, the modest undertaking is to take up the issue on the basis of circumstantial reflexes of contemporary sources in the main. It is beyond doubt that the practices of the early *caliphs* produced enormous implications on the political development of the Muslim world.

Analysis of the Hypotheses

Hypothesis I

That the practice of majority opinion in decision making process was a dependent factor upon the understanding and opinion of the minority but most experienced and versatile *Sahaba* (Companions).

This hypothesis is supported by numerous examples of the deeds and practices of the early caliphs.

First: the election of Abu Bakr

The prime and pivotal problem appeared in front of the Muslim community after the death of the Prophet was the question of leadership. Polarization of political communities on this matter clearly suggests that political consciousness of the people. At least three major political factions appeared each claiming their own right to be the successor of the Prophet. All the Ansa³ were in favor of making S'ad bin Ubadah as the successor⁴, while most of the Muhajirs (immigrants) gathered around Abu Baler and Umar and even some of them (Ali, Zubair and Talha) met in Fatima's house⁵ making other tribes scattered around their tribal leaders.⁶ Revitalization of the tribal political asabiyya confirms the reality of a tremendous diversity of opinions prevailing at that time. However, the matter ultimately was resolved in the yard of Banu Sadiyah through an arbitrary bai'ali (pledge of allegiance) made by Umar and Abu Ubaidha b. Jarrah⁷ to Abu Baler when the fiery exhortation was turning to be extremely sensible.⁸ Here we find that the discussion was limited within a few leading companions in the yard while there was a probable rather a certain presence of vast number of people and a crowded assembly.⁹

But again despite serious disagreement, once Umar and Abu Ubaidah arbitrarily made bai'ah to Abu Bakr by their own perspicacious judgment ignoring and bypassing all stumbling block of opinions¹⁰, majority of both the Ansa and Muhajirs and other tribes accepted it and made bai'an instantaneously. So the incident denotes that the decision was made by only one person (Umar) which was initially followed by leading companions and afterwards it gained mass and popular approval.¹¹

Second: nomination of Umar

Nomination of Umar by Abu Baler is another example supporting the hypothesis. No historian disagrees with the fact of Umar being nominated by Abu Bakr's personal choice and therefore they provided very few detail information concerning nomination other than that of 'ahd.¹² Ibn Qutaibah, however, goes further and

provides some details, which refer to Abu Baler's consultation with people regarding the matter from which some scholars conclude that the nomination was a community decision.¹⁴

But if we consider the same source, the chain of information proves that the decision was unilateral, although Abu Baler first sought opinion from Abd Rahman b. Auf and Uthman in secret.¹⁵ The same source also confirms that people came to Abu Baler and asked about the rumor (of appointment of Umar) after it was decided by Abu Baler himself. Eventually, they authorized Abu Baler to choose the next leader on their behalf once he had explained the reasons and situation to them up to their satisfaction.¹⁶ This authorization case *prima facie*, was an ultimate form of the transformation of majority opinion for the contemporary society and hence the conferring of the peoples' legitimacy. Objection may arise that that authorization itself tantamount to giving opinion. But it does not, in fact; because once authorization is made the authorized person's decision is binding upon those who endorse the authorization: and there remains for them no room for disagreement. On the other hand, in the absence of such authorization majority or people's opinion is the final one since they are the authority to decide.

Third: election of Uthman and Ali

The election of Uthman and Ali delineates the feature furthermore. The appointed six leading persons were given the ultimate authority to choose one from themselves since they were Ruasa and *Qadaat* (leaders).¹⁷ Moreover, this is supported by the method defined by Umar himself that says:

If five agreed upon one and the remaining one disagreed, kill him. If four agreed upon one and the other two disagreed, kill them. If three agreed upon one and the remaining three disagreed, then make Abdullah judge. If they do not agree with his judgment, then be with the group where Abd. Rahman B. Auf belongs to and kill the other group.¹⁸

This mechanism of selecting the next *caliph* rules out the opinion that Uthman was elected by an opinion poll or referendum

conducted by Abd. Rahman B. Auf because, otherwise, there is no logic behind appointing the six and defining the method of election.¹⁹ Furthermore, if the majority opinion goes in favor of one particular person in an opinion poll or referendum then the appointed six should have no right to disagree to that. However, in fact, the appointed six resolved the matter of selecting Uthman.²⁰

Similarly, people demanded to Ali to become the caliph, but he denied being a self appointed one and he referred to *Ahl al Shura and Ahl al Bard* as the only authoritative body to decide the matter.²¹ Whether this was followed or not, is a different case; because the issue had to be solved in an emergency. Yet, his reference to these two bodies proves the fact of dependency of majority opinion on the best few among them.

Hypothesis II

That the form of majority opinion was an *aposteriori* practice in the shape of *bai'ah* in contrast to *apriori* practice.

In modern day democratic practice majority opinion is an *apriori* factor and therefore is sought before the decision is made. In this process once majority opinion, positive or negative, reflects on a particular issue, it automatically become valid, justified and legitimate. Therefore, an authority here cannot be installed unless and until it undergoes the process and satisfies the conditions.

Contrary to this the form of reflective majority opinion practiced by the *caliphs* was an *apostariori* one in the form of *bai'ah*. *Bai'ah* is different from election or majority opinion in modern day democracy in two particular ways. One, election means to elect someone from among the claimed or nominated competing persons, while *bai'ah* is a promise of obedience and fidelity to an already elected or nominated person. Two, in election one is made authority and legitimate by people, while in *bai'ah* the authority and legitimacy seems to be predetermined.

Based on these criteria, the majority opinion practiced by the *caliphs* used to reflect in the form of *bai'ah*. For instance, we have seen earlier that Abu Bakr became *caliph* through an impromptu

bai'ah. made initially by Umar. Prior to this sudden act, the dispute was on the question as to from which sect of the Muslims the successor should come from. It is noteworthy that there was no political authority active in between the death of the Prophet and the becoming of Abu Bakr as the *caliph*. Noticing the harmful implication of power play or its frenzy at least, Abu Bakr even proposed for a possible power sharing in the form of joint presidency in response to the Ansars' proposal for dual leadership.²² It was in the same volatile situation that Umar made his unilateral *bai'ali* to Abu Bakr and consequently people from both sides polarized in dispute followed him and made *bai'ah*.

Under the circumstances as we reviewed, our thesis seems to have well founded that Abu Bakr was made an authority by only one person without seeking the peoples' opinion. Nevertheless, once even one person installed an authority, the majority of the people accepted it. Therefore, it is evident that *bai'an* was an *aposteriori* practice through which majority opinion used to reflect.

In the case of Umar if we analyze the historical documents and especially the reports documented by Ibn Qutaibah the fact is established that he was nominated unilaterally by Abu Bakr, probably due to the bitter experience he had in the absence of authority after the death of the prophet. Abu Bakr could comprehend it exactly that sharp social cleavages along class, tribal or communal lines did not actually mitigate itself with Islamic universal values; rather these remained impermanently blurred in their eyes under the *aura* of the divine charismatic leadership of the Prophet. Abu Bakr perceived that an authority by appointment could, in principle, be far more effective that to be left for majority opinion in creating the social condition that would resist political instability and permit, over, time the emergence of a stable system of the transfer of power.

People came to Abu Bakr asking about the rumors of the nomination of Umar and finally authorizing him to choose on their behalf. All these were after the nomination was done up for which Abu Bakr had sought no opinion from them earlier. However, once

his response made them satisfied they agreed to his choice. This suggests that peoples' opinion neither influenced his decision nor affected it. Eventually people made *bai'ab* to Umar after the death of Abu Bakr and certainly it was not to authorize him since it was not a dependent factor upon their approval, but to accept and submit to the authority already bestowed to him. This acceptance, no doubt, was an *aposteriori* practice appeared in the shape of *bai'ah*. And it was true in the case of Uthman, the third *caliph* and even truer in the case of Ali the last *caliph*, in as much as Ali was not elected by the majority opinion but by only a few and the majority people both inside and outside the capital made *baiyah* to him later.²³

Hypothesis III

That a single or a few persons' right opinion was more powerful and, therefore, practiced rather than the majority opinion to be discarded when the latter was considered untenable or unislamic.

At least three examples substantiate this hypothesis

First. Abu Bakr, the first *caliph's* first act was to implement the Prophetic command of the military expedition towards Syria under the leadership of Uthama B. Zaid appointed by the Prophet himself. But since immediately after the death of the Prophet many Arab tribes became *murtad* (apostates) refusing the authority of Abu Bakr and claiming prophethood for themselves challenging Islam, immediate security threat became incumbent on the nascent Islamic state. Considering this security threat the majority opinion was against the decision of sending troops outside the capital under the leadership of Uthama b. Zaid. Alternatively the opinion recommended the replacement of Uthama by an older general in case the prophetic decision was irreversible.²⁴

Abu Bakr, however, refused to accept this opinion on the ground that any reversed decision would be a clear disobedience to the directive of the Prophet, and ultimately his prevailed and he carried out the mission. So the majority opinion opposing the mission was defeated against a one-man decision.

It is beyond doubt that the majority opinion in this case reflected the realism of military science. They reasoned that the presence of troops at that time in the capital was more important to maintain political stability than to be sent abroad at that critical moment. This argument was proceeded from the realistic point of view that Prophetic order should be considered and evaluated from military perspective and strategic importance as well at that moment instead of looking at it from idealistic or religious perspective; because the prophetic decision was made at a time when the internal political stability of the state was not a risk. Nevertheless, Abu Bakr seemed to have been remained obdurate to follow the directive simply because it was from no one but the prophet himself.

Secondly, good governance does not always necessarily means adherence to majority opinion. Political realism sometimes requires to overlook majority opinion for the sake of greater sociopolitical and public interest. Abu Bakr appears here as a pure realist. His determination against the *murtad* tribes upon their renunciation to recognize his political authority, and to pay taxes was opposed by the majority of the people including Umar himself on the ground that they were also Muslims *per se* and therefore how war could be waged against them.²⁵ Umar tried to convince Abu Bakr on behalf of the people, but it came of no avail against the pragmatic leadership of Abu Bakr.

Respect to the majority opinion in this case would have directed the course of events towards another consequence, apparently no in favor of Islam. The military significance of this unyielding one-man-decision against all was certainly the most crucial at that time for integrity and supremacy of Islam. Had the majority opinion been applied in this regard, its consequences would have been historically portentous with questionable consequences.

Thirdly, one of the most complicated political deadlocks appeared during the era of the early caliphs was probably the one related to Uthman's resignation from the post of caliphate. People of Kufa and Egypt demanded Uthman's resignation accusing him of plotting political assassination. Ibn Qutaibah reports that Uthman issued a letter to Abu Sarah, governor of Egypt, to kill Mohammad B. Abu

Bakr upon his arrival in Egypt. The letter was discovered and made public to the people of Egypt. Therefore, they, later joined by the people of Kufa, demanded his resignation.

But Uthman refused to resign claiming that the letter was fictitious and was not issued by him at all. It is important to note here that previously no demand for resignation was made by the people of Kufa and Egypt when they submitted a letter to the caliph mentioning and protesting all objections they had against him and his governors in Kufa and Egypt.²⁶ However, when they demanded his resignation Uthman appeared to the people and answered to their objections.²⁷ And he even having been outmoded with the torments of objections, opposition and non-cooperation, asked Ali, Talha and Zubair to interfere with the crisis and solve the problem on their own.²⁸ However, probably the raving rebels went out of control and certainly there was lack of communication between Uthman and the Shura members; hence the prevalent confusion was over-confounding. Consequently, the crisis turned into a disaster.

Apparently, the political movement might have been manipulated by some political opportunists against the government of the *caliph* and he properly understood it. Therefore, Uthman did not yield to their presumptuous demands- especially the resignation. Uthman asserted to be right according to the best of his knowledge, therefore, did not resign, while the intransigent rebels' conception of their demand fuelled by popular support seemed valid and legal to them. Therefore, they were not in favor of his stay in power. Probably Uthman was a victim of political conspiracy wrought out by a group of Companions and the rebels were used as means to an end. This incident suggests that overthrowing a political authority by mass uprising was not an accepted norm in their political system, therefore, it was considered wrong and against the spirit of Islam. Uthman did not submit himself to this wrong opinion as was pervading the susceptible minds falling easy prey to be the suspect.

Hypothesis IV

That in their 'decentralized' system of governance the value of majority opinion of the people concerned (who were outside the

direct domain of the central authority) was held to be of much more reflective and functional utility and impact than the opinion of central authority.

There are a number of examples which go a long way to substantiate this hypothesis. Umar's dismissal of "Ammar b. Yasar upon the objection of the people of Kufa and replacement of him by Abu Musa on the recommendation of the Kufs and again his dismissal upon their objection was the most explicit example of respecting the majority opinion of the people of decentralized area.²⁹ These reports clearly highlight the objections of the people and their own choice about their governor; as Umar asked them "my fellow citizens of Kufa who do you want to be your governor?" this type of incidents was recurrent during the periods of Umar and Uthman. Here are a few:

1. The people of Basrah objected against the governor Mughirah B. Shuba to Umar that he had committed adultery. Umar instantly dismissed him appointing a new one without waiting for an investigation. .
2. Umar dismissed Khalid B. Walid from the post of commander-in-chief upon the report received from people and he explained the matter later on in a letter to the peoples of different provinces.³⁰
3. Umar dismissed Abu Musa from Basrah upon people's accusation.³¹
4. Uthman dismissed Walid B. Uqbah from Kufa upon peoples' accusation.³²
5. Uthman replaced Abdullah B. Abi Sarah by Muhammad B. Abi Bakr upon the request of the people of Egypt.³³

Conclusion

In conclusion, political participation in the early Islamic state was obviously evident. However, since the early community was accustomed to the 'revealed guidance' from the time of the Prophet, their conception and practice of majority opinion in decision making processes was of a different type. It is apparent from their practice that quantity and number did not determine truth, and

therefore Abu Bakr's one-man decision in the declaration of war against the rebelling tribes was right against the majority opinion. By contrast, Ali followed the majority opinion of not continuing the war against Muawia when the latter's force raised up the Quran on sticks in the battlefield, in spite of the fact that Ali was personally in favor of continuing the war. However, Ali followed the majority opinion which was politically a retrograde step as it was discovered later on that the raising of the Quran on sticks was a manifest deception. Both cases probe the supremacy of righteous opinion even if it was one against all. Despite the absence of a systematic political process, political participation by the people was clearly evident. Nevertheless, this type of participation was by no means an exact prototype to the present day democratic system. At times, minority opinion of the influential few weighted heavier, but in many other cases majority opinion of the people of decentralized areas were given foremost consideration in general.

It is noteworthy of being remembered always that though Islam brought about an ideology universal in nature and a system totally different from the existing ones, no systematic development of election process in order to install political authority and to make political decisions had yet been found effective to apply in practice. The shura system should have been the spirit and the pivotal characteristic of the Islamic political system; yet no rules, laws and codes of behaviors have so far been traceable to have been developed during the early Islamic state. Consequently, the Muslim community used to confront the similar problems repeatedly. Should the shura system been properly systematized, developed and practiced, it would have generated the greatest constitutional democracy ushered in the world worthy of being followed all along. However, it is certainly a great achievement of the early Islamic caliphs that their practices of electing political authority exemplified four different methods. What is more even is that the matter was left with the common people to be decided on their own, and the process clearly advanced from limited to greater participation of the people in the process, which is to say that democratic decision making was inherent in the Islamic political system.

Reference

1. M. Nazeer Ka Ka Khel. "Legitimacy of Authority in Islam", *Islamic Studies*, Journal of Central Institute of Islamic Studies, Karachi, Vol. XIX, No.3, Autumn 1980; "the Conceptual and Institutional development of *Shura* in Early Islam." *Islamic Studies*, Vol XIX, No.4, Winter 1980; Manzooruddin Ahmed, "The Classical Muslim State", *Islamic Studies*. Vol. I, No ... March 1962; Hamid Behzadi, "The principles of Legitimacy and its Influence upon the Muslim Political Thought", *Islamic Studies*. Vol. 10, 0.4. December 1970.
2. The Muslims who fought in the war of Badr. They acquired a distinct status in the Muslim society.
3. People of Medina who gave shelter to the migrating Muslims from Mecca.
4. Ibn Hisham. *Syrat al Nabi*. Cairo: Dar al Hidayah, nd. Vol. IV. P. 335; Ibn Qutaibah, *al Imaniah wa al Siyasali*. 1937. Egypt: *Mustafa al Babi al Halabi* and Sons Publications. Vol. I, p. 5; AI Tabari. 1962. *Tarikh al Umant wa al Muluk*. Beirut: Dar Saidaen. Vol. 3, IJ. 218; Ibn al Ithir. 1979. *AI Kamil fi al Tarikh*. Beirut: Dar Saidaen. Vol 2, p. 325.
5. Ibn Hisham. *Syrat al Nabi*, op cit., p. 35. Ibn Qutaibah. *AI Imamah wa al Siyasah*, op cit., p. 10.
6. Banu Umayyah gathered around Uthman, banu Zahrah gathered around Saad and Abd. Rahman b. Auf. See Ibn Qutaibah, *AI Imanian wa al Siyasah*, op cit., p. 10.
7. Ibid., p. 9; Ibn al Athir. *AI Kamil fi al Tarikh*, op cit., p. 330.
8. Ibn Hisham. *Syrat al Nabi*, op cit., p. 339 (*fa kathuru al lughat was irtafaat al aswat hatta takhwwafat al ikhtilaf*); Ibn al Athir. *AI Kamil fi al Tarikh*, op cit., p. 327.
9. All the historians Ibn Hisham, (*Syrat al Nabi*, vol. IV, pp. 335-41); Ibn Qutaibah (*AI Imamah wa al Siyasah* Vol. I. pp. 4-9); al Tabari (*Tarikh al Umani wa al Muluk* Vol. II, pp. 325-32); mention the names of Abu Bakr, Umar, saad b. Ubadah, Abu Ubaidah B. Jarrah, Hubbab b. Manzir and Bashir b. Saad.
10. Their reasoning was that Abu Bakr should be the caliph because he was most eminent, led in prayer, best among the Muhajirs, second of the Two in the cave etc. see Ibn Qutaibah, *AI Intamah wa al Siyasah* Vol. I, p. 9; Ibn al Athir, *AI Kamil fi al Tarikh* Vol. II, p. 330; AI Tabari, *Tarikh al Umam wa al Muluk* Vol. III, p. 221.
11. Umar. Abu Ubaidah, Usaid b. Hudair, Shar b. Sad and Salim b. Mawla. See Al Mawardi, *AI Ahkam at Sultaniyyah wa at Wilayar al Diniyyah*. Cairo: Dar al Fikr, 1983, pp, 6-7.
12. Abu Bakr made an 'Ahd a successive nomination pledge, or a royal appointment for Umar that he would be the next *caliph* after the death of Abu Bakr. This was so authentic and factual that historians made no disagreement whatsoever on it and none of them went without mentioning the text of the 'ahd.

13. Ibn Qutaibah, *al Imamali wa al Syasah*, op cit., Vol. I, p. 19.
14. M. Nazeer, *The Legitimacy of Authority ill Islam*, op cit.,
15. al Tabari, *Tarikh al Umanta wa al Muluk*, Vol. III, p. 428.
16. Ibn Qutaibah, al Imamali wa al Syasah, op cit., Vol. I, p. 19 (ya khalifatu Rasulillah anta khairuna wa a "alamuna fa ikhtar lana).
17. al Tabari, *Tarikh al Umama wa al Muluk*, Vol. III, p. 228
18. al Tabari, *Tarikh al Umama wa al Muluk*, Vol. III, p. 229.
19. That Abdur Rahman b. Auf conducted an opinion poll and found it in favor of Uthman and hence he was elected as the caliph. See Ibn Qutaibah, *al Imamali wa al Siyasah*, Vol. I, p. 26; Ibn Kathir, al Bidayah wa al Nihayah. Cairo: *Dar al Fikr al Arab*. 1993. Vol. VII, pp. 159-60.
20. See for details al Tabari, *Tarikh al Umama wa at Muluk*, Vol. III, pp- 230-31; Ibn Qutaibah, *al Imamali wa at Siyasah*, p. 26.
21. Ibn Qutaibah, *al Imamah. wa al Siyasah*, p. 46.
22. Abu Bakr's proposal was to appoint one from Anasers and. one from Muhajirs as *caliph*. See for details Ibn Qutaibah, *al Imamah wa al Siyasah*, p. 7; al Tabari, *Tarikh al Umama wa al Muluk*, Vol. III, p. 220; *Ibn al Athir, at Kamil fi al Tarikh*, Vol. II, p. 329.
23. Ibn Qutaibah, *al Imamah wa at Siyasah*, p. 46; al Tabari, *Tarikh al Umama wa at Muluk*, Vol. III, p. 427,429,433-4.,
24. al Tabari, *Tarikh al Umama wa al Muluk*, Vol. III, p. 225-6; Ibn al Athir, *al Kamil fi al Tarikh*, Vol. II, p. 334-5; Ibn Kathir, *al Bidayah wa al Nihayah*, Vol III, pp. 343-4.
25. Ibn Kathir, *al Bidayah wa al Nihayah*, Vol III, pp. 350-5 J; Ibn Qutaibah, al *Imamah wa at Siyasah*, p. J 7.
26. Ibn Qutaibah, *al Imaman wa at Siyasah*, p. 3]-32.
27. Ibid., p. 33.
28. Ibid., p. 34.
29. Ibn al Athir, *al Kamil fi al Tarikh*, Vol. III, p. 31-32; al Tabari, *Tarikh al Umania wa al Muluk*, Vol. IV, p. 163-65.
30. al Tabari, *Tarikh al Umama wa al Muluk*, Vol. IV, p. 68.
31. al Tabari, *Tarikli al Umama wa al Muluk*. Vol. IV, p. 264-65; Ibn al Athir, al Kamil fi al Tarikh, Vol. III, p. 99-100.
32. al Tabari, *Tarikh at Umania wa al Muluk*, Vol. IV, p. 271 -81; Ibn al Athir, al *Kamil fi al Tarikh*, Vol. III, p. 105-7.
33. Ibn Qutaibah, al Imamali wa al Siyasah, p. 36-37.